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1956] GOVERNMENT-SERVANT RELATIONSHIP 
INCIDENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT-SERVANT 
RELATIONSHIP* 
Ivor L. M. Richardsont 
633 
THE procedures developed in the past five years to meet the threat of communist infiltration into public employment 
have focused attention on the position of persons working for the 
federal government. However, the loyalty program and the gen-
eral problem of dismissal are n_ot the only aspects of federal employ-
ment which raise important issues. Other aspects of the govern-
ment-servant relationship may be of even greater importance to 
the civil servant in practice. For instance, what are his legal rights 
to his salary or to his pension if the government refuses to ,pay? 
Can he secure redress if he is suspended from the service? Is the 
government obliged to grant him annual leave, and what are his 
rights as to promotion? It is the purpose of this article to consider 
the rights of the servant of the federal government with regard 
to these matters. 
Before beginning the analysis, the distinction between offices 
and employments should be noted, for, as we shall see, whether a 
position is an office or an employment will often be determinative 
of the rights of the servant in regard to some of the incidents of 
the government-servant relationship. The Constitution of the 
United States provides for the creation of all offices and the appoint-
ment of all officers of the United States,1 and the weight of au-
thority2 supports the view that, in order to be an officer in the 
constitutional sense, a person must have been appointed in one of 
the constitutionally authorized modes, i.e., by the President by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, by the President alone, 
• This article is a chapter taken from a dissertation submitted to the faculty of the 
University of Michigan Law School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
S.J.D. degree. [Another chapter, "Problems in the Removal of Federal Civil Servants," 
was published in the December 1955 issue. 54 Mica. L. R.Ev. 219.-Ed.] 
t Solicitor of the Supreme Court of New Zealand.-Ed. 
1 Article 2, section 2 of the United States Constitution provides: " ... and he [the 
President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, 
and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise 
provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest 
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, 
in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." 
2 E.g., United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1878); Hoeppell v. United States, 
(D.C. Cir. 1936) 85 F. (2d) 237; United States v. Smith, 124 U.S. 525, 8 S.Ct. 595 (1888); 
Surowitz v. United States, (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 716. 
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by the head of a department, or by a court of law.3 Although the 
Constitution does not refer to the appointment of employees or 
other agents by the federal government, it was agreed from earliest 
times that the constitutional provisions do not preclude the em-
ployment by the federal government of persons other than officers. 
There is, however, no constitutional significance in the dis-
tinction between officers and employees. It is a matter of statutory 
interpretation, and so of determining the meaning of the terms 
as used by Congress in particular statutes. While at times some 
courts have indicated that there are some elements which are in-
dispensable attributes of an office, such as tenure, duration of 
appointment, and the idea that an officer is clothed with part of 
the sovereignty of the state,4 it is clear that there is nothing in-
herent in the nature of an office which distinguishes it from an 
employment.5 An officer must have been appointed in one of the 
constitutionally authorized modes whereas an employee may be, 
but need not be, and it is fair to say that the courts will treat the 
functions and duties involved, the term and tenure, the purpose 
of Congress in creating the position, and such incidental matters 
as the source of the compensation right, the duty to take an oath 
and to give a bond, as indicia in determining whether a person 
is an officer or employee of the United States. In the final analysis, 
s See note I supra. 
4 E.g., Pope v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (6th Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 1006, 
per Hamilton, C.J., at 1009: "Giving the word 'office' its technical qualities, five elements 
would seem indispensable in order to make a public office of a civil nature. (1) It must 
be created by the Constitution or the Legislature. . . . (2) There must be a delegation 
of a portion of the sovereign powers of government to be exercised for the benefit of 
the public. (3) The powers conferred and the duties to be discharged must be defined 
either directly or indirectly by the Legislature or through legislative authority. (4) The 
duties must be performed independently and without control of a superior power other 
than the law. (5) The office must have some permanency and continuity and the officer 
must take an official oath." 
5 The courts have refused to entertain the notion that any one of these alleged 
requirements is essential to constitute a post an office and to distinguish it from an 
employment. Furthermore, that there is no significance in the distinction between offices 
and employments is borne out by the fact that the courts have frequently considered 
a person an officer for some purposes and not for others. In United States v. Mouat, 124 
U.S. 303, 8 S.Ct. 505 (1888), the Supreme Court of the United States held that a pay-
master's clerk in the Navy was not an officer within the meaning of an 1876 statute so 
as to be entitled to the benefit of mileage allowance granted under that act, but, in 
United States v. Hendee, 124 U.S. 309, 8 S.Ct. 507 (1888), which was decided by the 
Court on the same day, it was held that such a clerk was an officer within the provisions 
of an 1883 statute regarding the longevity pay of officers and enlisted men in the Navy. 
Cf. United States v. Tyler, 105 U.S. 244 (1881) with McMullen v. United States, 100 Ct. 
Cl. 323 (1943); United States v. Tinklepaugh, (C.C. N.Y. 1856) 28 Fed. Cas. 193, No. 
16,526, with Douglas v. Wallace, 161 U.S. 346, 16 S.Ct. 485 (1896); and Steele v. United 
States (No. 2), 267 U.S. 505, 45 S.Ct. 417 (1925) with Keehn v. United States, (1st Cir. 
1924) 300 F. 493. 
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the courts will consider each case on its merits6 as a question of 
statutory interpretation. 
A. Compensation of Government Servants 
One of the basic conditions of service in any employment re-
lationship is the compensation attaching to the job and, for this 
reason, it is most important to know what rights a government 
servant has to his salary. It is necessary to consider offices, em-
ployments, and military posts . separately for it is this incident 
of the employment relationship that affords the greatest practical 
application of the distinction in the use of terms, even though 
that distinction is not itself of constitutional significance. 
In the case of a public office, the salary attached thereto is 
incident to the title to the office and not to the exercise of its 
functions7 with the result that, so long as he is the de jure in-
cumbent and absent any contrary statutory provision, the officer 
cannot be deprived of the compensation although he may be 
prevented by illness or other absence from performing his duties.8 
The reason for the rule is that the claim to salary rests upon acts 
of Congress and not upon an agreement to pay for services ren-
dered.9 But, on the other hand, the officer is entitled only to the 
compensation attached by law to the office.1° Consequently, if 
Congress has made no provision for the payment of the officer, 
he is deemed to be serving gratuitously or as a volunteer.11 
In the case of an employment, the right to compensation is 
dependent upon the rendering of service12 and so, if the employee 
does not fulfill his part of the bargain by exercising the functions 
of his employment, he cannot claim the payment of compensa-
6 This is borne out by such statements as that of Groner, J., in Morgenthau v. Barrett, 
(D.C. Cir. 1939) 108 F. (2d) 481 at 483: "In reaching a conclusion it is well to re-
member that the word 'officer' is a_ term of variable import, whose connotation changes 
with the setting in which it is used." 
7 E.g., Whiting v. United States, 35 Ct. Cl. 291 at 301 (1900); Pack v. United States, 
41 Ct. Cl. 414 (1906); Beuhring v. United States, 45 Ct. Cl. 404 (1910). 
s See Sleigh v. United States, 9 Ct. CI. 369 (1878), and the cases cited in the previous 
note. Of course, if the officer's conduct amounts to an abandonment of the office he will 
have no claim to the compensation attaching thereto. As to what amounts to abandon-
ment, see Barbour v. United States, 17 Ct. Cl. 149 (1881). 
9 United States v. McLean, 95 U.S. 750 at 751 (1877). 
lOBeuhring v. United States, 45 Ct. CI. 404 (1910), and the authorities there cited. 
In Adams v. United States, 20 Ct. Cl. 115 (1885), it was said at 117: "The appointing 
power has no control, beyond the limits of the statute, over the compensation, either 
to increase or diminish it." 
11 20 Comp. Gen. 267 (1940). Although the decision related to employees, it applies 
equally in this connection to officers of the United States. 
12 l Comp. Gen. 87 (1921); 5 Comp. Gen. 666 (1926). 
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tion.13 Unfortunately the courts have not always recognized this 
distinction,14 partly because they have not been able to decide 
conclusively whether or not there is a contractual element in the 
right to corr:,.pensation of both officers and employees. 
The position of members of the armed forces is different again. 
The rule to be deduced from the applicable statutes and regula-
tions is that both officers and men become entitled to their pay 
so long as they remain in their respective services whether or 
not they actually perform service, unless their right is forfeited 
in one of the modes prescribed in the statutory provisions or 
regulations.15 
It has never been seriously doubted that, in the absence of a 
constitutional restriction,1 6 Congress may increase or diminish 
the compensation of officers and employees of the United States.17 
This results from the long-established rule that neither an office 
nor an employment is a contract.18 Nevertheless, it does not neces-
sarily follow that none of the incidents of the government-servant 
relationship may be contractual in nature. Indeed, the courts 
have always been careful to say that statutes altering salaries of 
officers and employees can never have retrospective effect.19 In 
some cases20 the courts have so held on the basis that there is a 
13lbid. 
14 Thus, in Sleigh v. United States, 9 Ct. CL 369 (1878), Reinhard v. United States, 
10 Ct. Cl. 282 (1874), and Chisholm v. United States, 27 Ct. Cl. 94 (1892), the claimants 
were clerks and not officers in the constitutional sense of the term; yet the court applied 
the principle properly applicable to officers. And see Saunders v. United States, 21 Ct. 
CI. 408 (1886). · 
15 1 Comp. Gen. 87 (1921); 23 Comp. Gen. 978 (1944); 37 Op. Atty. Gen. 457 (1934). 
16 The constitutional limitations are that the compensation of the president shall 
neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been 
elected (art. II, §1), and that the judges, both of the Supreme Court and inferior courts, 
shall receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during 
their continuance in office (art. III, §1). For a discussion of the protection afforded to 
judges' salaries see O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 53 S.Ct. 740 (1933); and 
Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 53 S.Ct. 751 (1933). 
17 Embry v. United States, 100 U.S. 680 at 685 (1879); 15 Op. Atty. Gen. 316 at 
321 (1877); Fitzsimmons v. Leon, (1st Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 886. 
18 Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99, 10 S.Ct. 431 (1890); Butler v. Pennsylvania, 
10 How. (51 U.S.) 402 (1850); Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 20 S.Ct. 1009 (1900); 
Bailey v. Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46, affd. on appeal by equally divided 
Court, 341 U.S. 918, 71 S.Ct. 669 (1951). 
19 Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U.S. 131, 6 S.Ct. 329 (1885); Mississippi ex rel. 
Robertson v. Miller, 276 U.S. 174, 48 S.Ct. 266 (1928); Fisher v. United States, 15 Ct. Cl. 
323 (1879). 
20 See the cases cited in the previous note. In Fisher's case, Richardson, J., said at 
329: "The only contract which arises upon a statute establishing a salary is to pay the 
incumbent of the office that salary while the law remains in force and unchanged. 
When the statute is repealed, superseded, or amended so as to alter the amount of the 
salary for the time being, the contract from that time forward is correspondingly changed." 
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contract right to receive such compensation as may from time 
to time be provided by law. In other cases21 the courts, while 
recognizing the existence of a right to the compensation, have 
disclaimed its contractual origin without giving any explanation 
of its source. · 
One reason for this is that throughout the government-servant 
relationship the incidents thereof are dominated by the public 
law, with the result that it is extremely difficult to point to the 
true source of any rights which the officer or employee may have. 
For instance, although their compensation may be altered, this 
may be done only by the legislature or under its direction.22 Again, 
no portion of the salary of an officer may be withheld without 
specific statutory authority23 and so an officer who agrees to accept 
less than the full compensation attached to his office is entitled 
to claim the statutory allowance, even though he agreed to accept 
a reduction as a condition of his continued employment in the 
government service.24 This is because public policy prohibits 
any attempt by unauthorized agreement with an officer of the 
United States, under guise of a condition or otherwise, to deprive 
him of the right to pay-given by statute,25 and the same reasoning 
should apply to a federal employee whose compensation has been 
fixed by statute. Furthermore, the dominance of the public law 
over the will of the parties can be seen in the established rule that 
compensation may not be paid an employee for any period prior 
to the effective date of his appointment and that the appointment 
may not be made retroactively effective to cover services ren-
dered.26 In one case an employee had served without an appoint-
ment in connection with the establishment of the Selective Service 
21 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Kansas City, Mo., (8th Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 998; Fitz-
simmons v. Brooklyn, 102 N.Y. 536 (1886). 
22 Dyer v. United States, 20 Ct. Cl. 166 (1885); Amchanitzky v. Carrougher, (D.C. 
N.Y. 1933) 3 F. Supp. 993. In Corcoran v. United States, 38 Ct. Cl. 341 (1903), Nott, 
C.J., said at 345: "Two things are essential to deprive an officer of his statutory compen-
sation: The first is that the power so to do must be lodged, directly or by necessary 
implication, in some official hands; the second is that it must be exercised actually and 
expressly, and not indirectly or by implication." 
23 Corcoran v. United States, 38 Ct. Cl. 341 (1903); Smith v. Jackson, 246 U.S. 388, 
38 S.Ct. 353 (1918); McCarl v. Cox, (D.C. Cir. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 669; 40 Op. Atty. Gen. 
38 (1941). 
24 Glavey v. United States, 182 U.S. 595, 21 S.Ct. 891 (1901); United States v. 
Andrews, 240 U.S. 90, 36 S.Ct. 349 (1916); Rush v. United States, 35 Ct. CI. 223 (1900). 
Cf. Jackson v. United States, 8 Ct. CI. 354 (1872), where the Secretary of the Treasury 
had made an appointment on terms of compensation differing from the salary expressly 
established by law. 
25 United States v. Andrews, 240 U.S. 90, 36 S.Ct. 349 (1916). 
26 20 Comp. Gen. 267 (1940). 
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System before the congressional act authorizing the employment 
of necessary staff had come into effect. Despite a promise to pay 
on the part of the responsible government official, the comptroller 
general held that the employee must be regarded either as a volun-
teer or as furnishing gratuitous service and not entitled to com-
pensation in any event.27 , 
The final and fundamental problem is, what is the nature of 
the claim to compensation? Is it based on contract, is it founded 
on quantum meruit or restitution as a fair reward for services 
rendered, or is it dependent upon the laws of Congress as an in-
cident of a statutory status relationship? Before considering this 
it is important to determine what the term "status" means since 
it has been subject to so many indefinite interpretations by the 
courts and has, in many cases, degenerated to mean any type of 
legal relationship:28 
The hallmark of status is the attaching to a legal relationship 
of rights and duties imposed by the public law and not by mere 
agreement of the parties. But it means more than that. It has 
been suggested by an English writer29 that, where there is 
"status," the legal relationship can be determined only by opera-
tion of law. This would be a valuable criterion if it were one 
hundred percent accurate, for it would serve to distinguish such 
typical status relationships as infancy and marriage from the 
master-servant relationship which, though subjected in many coun-
tries to so many incidents imposed by the public law-such as 
working conditions, wage scales, compulsory unionism, provisions 
for annual and sick leave, restrictions on arbitrary dismissal, hours 
of work, and other conditions of employment-is distinctive in 
that the relationship may be terminated without recourse to the 
public law. 
Unfortunately there is not a rigid line of demarcation between 
status and contract in this connection. For instance, even in the 
case of the marriage relationship, an English court has recognized 
a foreign marriage which was capable of being dissolved simply 
by agreement of the spouses30 and, although it may be argued 
that this is not so much a case of the termination of a status re-
lationship without the intervention of the public law as it is of 
the recognition and application of a foreign law, still it indicates 
21 Ibid. 
28 It is necessary to read only a few decisions of the comptroller general to realize this. 
29 GRAVESON, STATUS IN THE COMMON LAW 48 (1953). 
ao Nachimson v. Nachimson, 99 L.J. (n.s.) (Prob.) 104 (1930). 
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that the basic status relationship is not so squarely bounded by 
and dependent upon the public law as has been thought. 
Again, from the point of view of a worker with specialist skills, 
unless he is willing to learn another trade, the terms of his employ-
ment may be so rigidly determined by the public law that the 
only element of "contract" in the employer-employee relationship 
(apart from his implied agreement to work under those conditions 
or else seek another occupation) is the agreement to work or cease 
working for a particular employer.31 Then, where there is 
compulsory unionism, the potential worker cannot even secure 
an employment unless he joins the appropriate union. To carry 
the notion further, take the case of the civilian who, in time of 
war is assigned to a particular job-there is no question of agree-
ment, unless it is an implied duty arising from the correlative 
rights and duties of allegiance and protection stemming from the 
government-citizen relationship. 
Just as the release from a particular status relationship may 
be based purely on agreement or secured with the aid of the public 
law, so may the entrance to a status relationship be voluntary or 
involuntary, although it is important to remember that it is not 
the agreement but the public law which imposes the status. In 
the case of marriage, citizenship acquired by naturalization, peace-
time service in the regular armed forces, it is voluntary and the 
agreement is the gateway to the status relationship into which 
the rights and duties under the contract may be said to merge, 
while in the case of citizenship by birth, infancy and insanity in 
their legal aspects, and service in the armed forces under a com-
pulsory military training program or under draft laws, it is 
involuntary. 
It seems then that there is no particular factor the presence or 
absence of which will inevitably determine whether or not the 
legal relationship is one of status. Rather it is a matter of degree 
and the most that can be said is that, for a true status relationship 
to exist, the great majority of the incidents thereof must be fixed 
by the public law32 so that the element of contract plays a minor 
31 As Graveson points out, note 29 supra, at 47 ff., in some ways there is not much 
difference between the employment position of the modern worker and the member of 
one of the Guilds of th~ Middle Ages as far as rigidity of conditions is concerned. 
32 In this connection, two of Graveson's points are worth noting. Assuming that 
status denotes a legal personality different from the norm, he argues (1) that a disability 
or exemption imposed by the public law must be such as to affect substantially and 
generally a man's legal standing in order for a special status to result (p. 126), and (2) 
that the public and social interest both in its existence and extent will be the funda-
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part and serves as little more than a gateway to and from the 
relationship. . 
It may well be asked, what is the exact significance of the dis-
tinction between status and contract. It is not so much the type 
of relationship as the nature of the particular incident of the re-
lationship which is under consideration that is important. As a 
Minnesota court recently pointed out, "Confusion results from 
a failure to observe the fundamental distinction between status 
and the rights which arise thereunder."33 A status incident is, 
of course, imposed by the public law. More important, by its very 
nature it is variable at the will of the government for it does not 
give rise to vested property rights in the other party to the relation-
ship. On the other hand, where the particular incident, i.e., salary, 
is contractual in nature, the government servant may have some 
vested rights. Thus, if in the particular relationship the right to 
past salary is a status incident, it may be abrogated at will by the 
government. But, if it happens to be a contractual incident of the 
government-servant relationship, then the official will have a 
vested property right to his salary in respect ~f past services. 
It is impossible to reconcile the dicta of the different judges 
on the right to compensation. Clearly there is no claim to com-
pensation in respect of future services but, as we saw, the courts 
have always recognized that government servants are entitled to 
recover compensation for past services. The theory which has the 
greater weight of authority behind it is that such a right is con-
tractual in origin and, in the words of Justice Miller in Fisk v. 
Jefferson Police ]ury,34 " ••• after the services have been rendered, 
under a law, resolution, or ordinance which fixes the rate of com-
pensation, there arises an implied contract to pay for those services 
at that rate. This contract is a completed contract. Its obligation 
is perfect, and rests on the remedies which the law then gives for 
its enforcement." On the other hand, in a recent case it was said: 
mental factor determining the creation or attribution of status. It appears to the 
writer that these are simply explanations of the basic proposition suggested in the text 
that, whether or not the dominance of the public law is sufficient to confer a status is 
a matter of degree. 
33 Boyle v. Kirby, 223 Minn. 268 at 272, 26 N.W. (2d) 223 (1947). 
34116 U.S. 131 at 134, 6 S.Ct. 329 (1885). Likewise in Patton v. United States, 7 
Ct. CI. 362 (1870), Drake, C.J., said at 371: "All questions of salary are questions of 
contract. Whether the salary be fixed by law, or by the order of a Department under 
authority of law, the Government contracts to pay the officer his salary, and, failing to 
do so is liable to be sued therefor." This dictum of course does not apply to claims for 
unearned salary. 
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" ... the right of a public official to compensation must be founded 
on a statute; and a statute granting a public official compensation 
should be strictly construed against the officer. Furthermore, the 
right of a public officer to be compensated by salary for the per-
formance of duties imposed upon him by law, does not rest on 
any theory of contract, express or implied, but is purely a creature 
of statute .... "35 
There is a great deal of merit in this contention. In the first 
place, as compensation of an officer is an incident to the title to 
the office and not to the exercise of its functions, how can the 
"right" of the officer to the compensation be postulated on the 
rendering of services, which is the rationale of Fisk's case? In any 
case this disposes of the argument that the right to compensation 
is based on quantum meruit or restitution.36 Even if we say that 
the contractual right is to the compensation provided for having 
held the office, there is not much room for the operation of a 
contract. In the second place, employees have no claim to com-
pensation for services rendered unless there is statutory authority 
for their employment,37 and it may reasonably be argued that 
the only power to create employments and employ servants other 
than officers which the Executive has is that granted by Congress 
and thus under the public law.38 In the third place, where the 
compensation of an officer or employee has been fixed by law, the 
parties (i.e., the executive department and the officer or employee) 
cannot validly agree to vary it and the appointing power has no 
control over the compensation beyond the limits of the statute, 
either to increase or to diminish it. The Supreme Court of the 
United States in one case39 considered the reason for this rule. to 
be that such claims "rest not upon any contract with the Govern-
ment, either express or implied, but upon acts of Congress." 
35 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Kansas City, l\Io., (8th Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 998 at 1001, 
per Von Valkenburgh, C.J. 
36 Since the foundation of that remedy is a return for services rendered. 
37 Thus, in Jordan v. United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 577 (1952), where the plaintiff's 
contention that the Agreement of Enrollment constituted a contract on the part of the 
Government to pay him for the entire period of his enrollment in the War Department 
Transportation Corps was not sustained, Howell, J., said at 591: "Congress is the only 
body under our Constitution with the authority to consent to the assumption of 
liability by the United States or authorize others to do so." 
38 The reason for this was well stated in Love v. United States, (8th Cir. 1939) 
108 F. (2d) 43 at 46: "Unless a legal right has been defined and conferred by legislative 
authority, no justiciable controversy is present. • . • The right to work at a particular 
employment must be shown to have become vested by law in the person asserting it." 
39 United States v. McLean, 95 U.S. 750 at 751 (1877). Although the dictum was 
pronounced with regard to an officer's compensation, it is difficult to see why it should 
not also apply to the claim of an employee whose compensation is fixed by statute. 
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Despite these weighty arguments it seems that the right to 
past compensation is properly based on contract. As we shall see, 
"rights" to pension and leave are based on the statutory status 
relationship ( or, perhaps more correctly, they should be termed 
status incidents of the relationship), yet even such leave and pen-
sion rights as have accrued to the officer or employee may be 
denied him at any time. Such action does not deprive the officer 
or employee of property without due process of law, but it is sub-
mitted that if Congress attempted to deprive an officer or employee 
of "past" compensation its action would be unconstitutional as 
violative of the Fifth Amendment. 40 
However, as often happens in this area, the legal right is not 
very valuable without an effective remedy. The Court of Claims 
may render judgment against the United States in respect to 
pension and salary claims of both officers and employees.41 Under 
section 2517 of Title 28 of the United States Code, certified judg-
ments of the court are to be paid by. the General Accounting office 
out of any general appropriation therefor. Although there is no 
execution against the Government, a government servant may 
obtain a writ of mandamus against the comptroller general if the 
administration refuses to pay such a claim.42 
Non-appropriation of funds does not relieve the United States 
of its contractual liability to pay the compensation of its servants. 
Article 1, section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution providing that 
" ... no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in conse-
quence of appropriations made by law" is exclusively a direction 
to the officers of the Treasury and it neither controls courts nor 
prohibits the creation of legal liabilities.43 An officer or employee of 
the United States is entitled to the compensation allowed by law 
40 Because valid contracts are property within the protection of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 at 579, 54 S.Ct. 840 (1934), and the cases 
there cited. 
4128 U.S.C. (1952) §§1346 {d) and 1491. 
42 See Houston v. Ormes, 252 U.S. 469, 40 S.Ct. 369 (1920); Louisiana v. McAdoo, 
234 U.S. 627, 34 S.Ct. 938 (1914). And see 3 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 97 (1934). However, 
the American courts originally followed the English view expressed in R. v. Lords Com-
missioners of the Treasury, L:R· 7 Q.B. 387 (1872), that mandamus would not lie in 
such circumstances. Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 2 S.Ct. 128 (1883). 
43 Richardson, J., pointed out in Mitchell v. United States, 18 Ct. Cl. 281 at 286 
(1883): "The United States can no more discharge its contracts by part performance 
than can an individual person do so. Congress may fail to appropriate, in whole or in 
part, the money required for payment of a public creditor, and thus leave the public 
officers without authority to draw the money from the Treasury for that purpose, but 
the indebtedness and the liability to pay re~ain in force." Likewise, see Schuler and 
McDonald v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 631 (1937). 
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and is not limited by the amount supplied, even if a lesser sum is 
provided for his services by Congress44 unless, of course, the appro-
priation act contains words which expressly or by clear implication 
modify or repeal the previous law.45 
Certified judgments of the Court of Claims are to be paid 
out of any general appropriation for that purpose. It need hardly 
be added that, even though there is a theoretical legal right, the 
claimant will in practice fail to get redress if Congress refuses to 
vote the necessary funds.46 Though appropriation of funds is not 
a condition precedent to the creation of liability on the part of 
the United States, it is for all practical purposes the governing 
factor in determining whether or not the United States will in fact 
meet its obligations to the federal servant. 
A pragmatist confronted with this situation would doubtless 
argue that there is in effect no legal right to the salary. But the 
view adopted in this paper is that the lack of an effective and 
guaranteed remedy does not necessarily connote the non-existence 
of a legal right-the lack of substantive rights is not to be inferred 
from the failure of the legal order to provide procedural remedies. 
As Chief Justice Hughes said in Perry v. United States, " ... the 
right to make binding obligations is a competence attaching to 
sovereignty .... The fact that the United States may not be sued 
without its consent is a matter of procedure which does not affect 
the legal and binding character of its contracts."47 As there is no 
right of execution against the government in Anglo-American 
law, then adoption of the pragmatic approach will lead to the 
conclusion that there are no legal rights against the government 
under any circumstances. This seems to be far too extreme a 
position. 
B. Suspension 
It is not uncommon for the Executive to suspend a civil servant 
after charges have been made against him while it is being con-
44 United States v. Langston, 118 U.S. 389, 6 S.Ct. 1185 (1886); Collins v. United 
States, 15 Ct. Cl. 23 (1879). 
45 E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 109 U.S. 146, 3 S.Ct. 151 (1883) (expressly); United 
States v. Fisher, 109 U.S. 143, 3 S.Ct. 154 (1883) (impliedly). 
46 Hetfield v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 419 (1933). It may with some force be argued 
that, if Congress has conferred a right of action in contract or tort on the citizen as against 
the United States, once judgment has been given in the citizen's favor, there should be 
no legal obstacles to recovery. Cf. Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 at 702 (1864): 
" ... the award of execution is a part, and an essential part of every judgment passed 
by a court exercising judicial power." 
47 294 U.S. 330 at 353-354, 55 S.Ct. 432 (1935). 
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sidered what final action should be taken. The period of suspen-
sion ·may often enable a more thorough investigation to be made 
of the civil servant's fitness for continued service than if action 
were to be taken immediately, particularly if the charges against 
him arise under the loyalty and security program. In any case, it 
is important that the government servant should know his legal 
rights during a period of suspension. 
The word suspension never signifies a final removal of an 
officer or employee because in its nature a suspension is tem-
porary and the necessary effect of a termination of the suspension 
is a reinstatement of the suspended government servant where 
the law has not othenvise provided.48 It was at one time a matter 
of some doubt, but it now seems to have been conclusively settled 
that, in the absence of a statutory provision, the power of suspen-
sion is an incident of the power of appointment and removal.49 
In this respect the A'inerican law differs from the English which 
recognizes the power of suspension as a separate power inherent 
in the Crown.50 
The power of suspension must, of course, be exercised by the 
officer in whom is vested the power of appointment; otherwise 
the purported suspension is invalid and the officer or employee 
is entitled to his compensation,51 although the legal requirement 
is satisfied if the act of suspension performed by a subordinate 
official is ratified by the competent authority.52 One question is 
whether, in the absence of a statutory provision governing sus-
pensions, the power to suspend must be exercised in accordance 
with the procedures prescribed for the exercise of the power of 
removal. This has been held to be so, the reasoning apparently 
being that the power of suspension is incident to the power of 
removal and consequently a suspension is subject to the same 
procedures as a removal.53 But the better view is that the power 
of suspension is incident to the combined power of appointment 
and removal.54 Consequently, in the absence of a governing statu-
tory provision, it may be exercised freely without having to 
conform to any specific procedures. 
48 See 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 221 at 223 (1870); id., 301 at 304-305; id., 308 at 309. 
49 Howard v. United States, 22 Ct. CI. 305 at 316 (1887); 4 Comp. Gen. 849 at 851 
(1925); 6 Comp. Gen. 534 at 536 (1927)1 25 Dec. C.T. 996 (1919). 
50 Slingsby's Case, 3 Swans. 178, 36 Eng. Rep. 821 (1680); Hunkin v. Siebert, 51 C.L.R. 
538 (1934). 
51 United States v. Wickersham, 201, U.S. 390, 26 S.Ct. 469 (1906). 
521 Comp. Gen. 42 (1921). 
53 Miller v. United States, 45 Ct. Cl. 509 (1910). 
54 See the authorities cited in note 48 supra. 
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The right of recovery of salary after a wrongful suspension 
was for many years a perplexing question, although it has now 
been resolved. Before the 1948 amendment to the civil service 
act was passed,55 the answer depended on several factors. First, 
(and the law is unchanged on this. point) if an officer was sus-
pended, he was entitled to his compensation during the period 
of his suspension, even though he performed no duties, under 
the well-settled rule that the right to compensation attached to a 
public office is an incident to the title to the office,56 and not to 
the exercise of the functions of the office. Secondly, in the absence 
of statutory authority, _an employee (as distinguished from "offi-
cer") clearly had no right to compensation unless his suspension 
was followed by restoration to duty, 57 except to the extent of pay 
for annual leave which might be substituted for a period of un-
justified suspension.58 This was because salary payments to em-
ployees may validly be made only for periods when the employees 
are in actual duty status or are on authorized leave with pay.159 
Thirdly, and although there is some authority for the opposing 
view, 60 it seems that these principles applied regardless of the fact 
that the appointing officer had suspended the employee on the 
understanding that if, as it turned out, he was found not guilty 
of the charges preferred against him, he should receive his regular 
compensation.61 Fourthly, in Ginn v. United States62 it was held 
that, where a federal employee was suspended ·upon reasonable 
1515 62 Stat. L. 354, c. 447 (1948), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §652. 
156 11 Comp. Gen. 382 (1932); Steele v. United States, 40 Ct. CI. 403 (1905). Such 
cases as Barbour v. United States, supra note 8 and Howard v. United States, supra 
note 49 where the suspended officer was denied his compensation during the period of 
suspension, were governed by a congressional statute specifically prohibiting the payment 
of salary to suspended officers. 
It is a matter of some doubt whether a suspended officer can recover compensation 
from the government if a de facto officer has performed the services and received the 
compensation attaching to the office. On the one hand, it may be argued that the 
government must pay the salary to the holder of the legal title, because the salary is 
attached to the office and is not based upon the rendering of particular services. On 
the other hand, it may be contended that the burden of establishing title is not upon 
the government and once it has paid compensation to a person ostensibly holding the 
office as of right its obligation ceases as it is unfair to compel it to pay twice (and in 
view of congressional control over finances, it is not entitled to do so). There is little 
authority on this point insofar as it affects federal officers but Arant v. United States, 
55 Ct. CI. 327 (1920), indicates that the suspended de jure officer has no clainl against 
the government but must attempt to recover the compensation from the de facto officer. 
157 21 Comp. Gen. 717 (1942); 7 Comp. Gen. 584 (1928). 
158 25 Comp. Gen. 620 (1946), and the authorities there cited. 
159 6 Comp. Gen. 534 at 536 (1927); 11 Comp. Gen. 382 (1932). 
60 6 Comp. Gen. 534 at 536 (1927); 4 Comp. Gen. 849 (1925). 
61 9 Comp. Gen. 284 (1930); 25 Comp. Gen. 620 at 624 (1946). 
62 110 Ct. Cl. 637 (1948). 
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cause, as distinguished from an arbitrary suspension, and where 
he was afforded proper and regular procedure, he was not entitled 
to compensation for the period of suspension. This was so even 
though it was subsequently determined after investigation of the 
charges that the cause for which he was suspended was insufficient, 
the result following from the rule that the decision of a department 
head is not subject to judicial review provided that the prescribed 
procedures have been followed and provided that there is no 
evidence of arbitrary or capricious action on his part.63 
The 1948 amendment gave new substantive rights to classified 
civil servants to receive compensation in certain circumstances 
for periods when no services had been performed, and it has since 
been held64 that, by virtue of this amendment, the rule expressed 
in Ginn' s case is no longer applicable to classified civil service 
employees suspended or removed for a cause subsequently found 
to be insufficient. But the amendment applies only to persons in 
the classified civil service of the United States65 and, consequently, 
the principle enunciated in Ginn' s case is still applicable to non-
classified and excepted schedule civil service employees.66 Of 
course, this section does not deprive an officer of the United States 
who is not in the classified civil service of the right to compensa-
tion for a period of suspension. 
C. Pension Rights 
Applicants for employment in the government service are 
attracted by the general conditions of service, including retirement 
provisions, as well as by the actual salaries paid, and retirement 
benefits will often make up for higher pay scales in positions 
where no such benefits are offered. Over the years the retirement 
schemes have been gradually extended until at the present time 
virtually all officers and employees of the United States come 
within some one of these schemes. It is not proposed to consider 
the different schemes, since they are all based on statutory pro-
v1s10ns. The reason for this dependence on statutory provisions 
1s that, as we have seen, Congress is the only body which has 
63 E.g., Gadsden v. United States, (Ct. CI. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 126; Vallesteros v. United 
States, 125 Ct. CI. 218 (1953). 
64 Lezin v. United States, (Ct. CI. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 574, approved in Egan v. United 
States, (Ct. CI. 1952) 107 F. Supp. 564; and Getzoff v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1953) 109 
F. Supp. 712. 
65 62 Stat. L. 354 (1948), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §652 (b). 
66 Brown v. United States, 122 Ct. CI. 361 (1952); Jordan v. United States, 123 Ct. 
CI. 577 (1952). 
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authority to consent to the assumption of liability by the United 
States, or to authorize others to do so and, therefore, in the absence 
of that authority, the Executive has no power to provide pensions 
for its retired servants. 
As distinguished from salaries and wages, pensions have always 
been considered a matter of bounty. Justice Brandeis once ex-
plained this in a well-known judgment when he said: "Pensions, 
compensation allowances and privileges are gratuities. They in-
volve no agreement of parties; and the grant of them creates no 
vested right. The benefits conferred by gratuities may be redis-
tributed or withdrawn at any time in the discretion of Congress. "67 
Again, Chief Justice Taft pointed out in United States v. Gook: 
" ... Congress in shaping the form of its bounty may impose con-
ditions and limitations on its acquisition and enjoyment by the 
beneficiaries which it could not impose on the use and enjoyment 
by them of a vested right. "68 
In these cases the Court was considering non-contributory 
pensions and we meet with greater difficulty in determining the 
rights (if any) of a government servant to a pension where he 
has made periodic contributions to the pension fund during his 
term of service.69 There is little authority either way on this 
point, but in one case, Pennie v. Reis,70 the Supreme Court re-
garded as the controlling factor the manner in which the contri-
bution was paid to the fund and, basically, whether the contribu-
tion was voluntary or involuntary. In that case the Court had to 
consider the effect of a direct appropriation to a pension fund of a 
monthly sum out of a police officer's pay, and Justice Field said: 
"Though called part of the officer's compensation, he never re-
ceived it or controlled it, nor could he prevent its appropriation 
67 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 at 577, 54 S.Ct. 840 (1954). And see Frisbie 
v. United States, 157 U.S. 160 at 166, 15 S.Ct. 586 (1895); and United States v. Teller, 
107 U.S. 64 at 68 (1882). 
es 257 U.S. 523 at 527, 42 S.Ct. 200 (1922). Of course, if a statute imposes a peremp-
tory obligation on the executive to grant a pension under certain conditions, a person 
who satisfies those conditions has a right to the pension so long as the statute remains 
in force and the right is enforceable against the appropriate official. Dismuke v. United 
States, 297 U.S. 167, 56 S.Ct. 400 (1936); 28 Op. Atty. Gen. 417 at 421 (1910). But, in 
such a case the right, though founded on statute, is neither a property nor a contractual 
right; otherwise it could not be constitutionally abrogated by Congress. But see pp. 655-
658 infra. 
69 This is an important issue in view of the proposal to make available to civilian 
officers and employees of the United States group life insurance which would be financed 
partly by voluntary salary deductions and partly by government subsidy. See I U.S.C. 
Cong. and Admin. News 857 (1954). 
70132 U.S. 464, IO S.Ct. 149 (1889), followed in Rafferty v. United States, (3d Cir. 
1954) 210 F. (2d) 934, and see the cases there cited. 
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to the fund in question. He had no such power of disposition 
over it as always accompanies ownership of property."71 
It is clear, in view of the weight of authority, that a pension 
cannot be regarded as postponed compensation, and it seems that, 
unless the officer or employee may refuse to contribute to the pen-
sion fund, he has no vested rights in it whatsoever and cannot 
even recover the forced deductions from his salary. Furthermore, 
it is suggested that, even if he voluntarily contributed to the pen-
sion fund, he would not be entitled to an annuity or other benefi_t 
at the rate fixed by statute, either at the time he began making 
contributions or at the time he became eligible to receive the 
pension. The Court would, it seems, conclude that the govern-
. ment could not contract to pay him a pension at a fixed rate72 
and so would probably consider him entitled only to a refund of 
his contributions and to interest thereon. 
D. Leave 
Some of the most important incidents of service from the em-
ployees' point of view are those relating to leave. It is important 
for the employee to know if, and how long, he will be entitled 
to draw his salary should he be taken ill. Again, an applicant 
for government employment will be interested in knowing how 
much vacation he will be allowed. 
There are full statutory provisions regulating the granting of 
leave of absence and sick leave to officers and employees of the 
United States.73 In the absence of any statutory provision, the 
grant of leave of absence with or without pay to government 
servants whose compensation is fixed by an appropriation has 
been considered within the discretion of the head of the depart-
ment.74 
71132 U.S. 464 at 470, 10 S.Ct. 149 (1889). 
72 This is simply because "the United States as the sovereign IS rmmune from 
liability in the absence of congressional action, and neither the President nor any of his 
executive officers, nor the courts, possess power to impose such liability." Brown v. 
United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 361 (1952), per Howell, J., at 377, and see the authorities there 
cited. This is particularly so where the Executive, without authority, attempts to impose 
on Congress liability for future pension payments. 
73 See 65 Stat. L. 679 (1948), as amended, 5 U.S.C. (1952) §§2061-2066. 
74 19 Dec. C.T. 661 (1913). The correctness of ·this decision is perhaps doubtful in 
view of the rule that compensation may be paid to employees only for services rendered, 
but it is suggested that the rule in fact permits the payment of compensation so long 
as the employee is in an actual duty status or is on authorized leave with pay (see note 
59 supra). This is supported by the fact that employees are paid a week's salary in 
respect of five or five and a half days' work. Thus, in 23 Comp. Gen. 541 (1944), it was 
held within administrative discretion to suspend a per annum employee on Sundays 
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All provisions for leave of absence are conditioned on the 
discretion of the Executive as to whether it shall be allowed to 
the government servant.711 But, this is not all. First, a person is 
entitled or, to be more accurate, is eligible for leave only while 
he is in the government service.76 So, unless a special statute pro-
vides otherwise, if an officer or employee resigns or is discharged 
before taking accrued leave, he loses his right to it, while if he 
dies before receiving it, his estate is not entitled to collect the 
money value.77 Secondly, neither an officer nor an employee has 
a legally enforceable right to accrued leave.78 Understandably he 
can have no rights in respect of leave which will accrue as the 
result of future service, but it is not easy to see why he can be 
deprived of leave which has accrued from past government service. 
The courts have, as an initial assumption, treated annual leave 
as being intended simply "to secure to the individual employee 
a vacation for refreshment and recuperation,"79 and not as a bonus 
or as a congressional device to increase an employee's pay.8° Con-
sequently, it is wholly under the control of Congress, which may 
withhold or reduce it at any time. 
Thus, in Field v. Giegenack81 a statute reducing the annual 
leave of absence of government employees_ with pay from thirty 
and withhold, as a disciplinary measure, the compensation he otherwise would have 
received for Sundays had he not been suspended from working or the opportunity of 
working if he had been obliged to work on Sundays. 
In an opinion of the attorney general there is an interesting analysis of the nature 
of leave. In holding that a certain statute did not cover per diem or piece workers, the 
attorney general said [27 Op. Atty. Gen. 613 at 619 (1909)]: '"Leave of absence' seems 
to imply a surrender by the Government of time or service which is a part of a larger 
total time or service contracted for by the Government. The statement that pay shall 
not be 'forfeited' during the leave of absence similarly suggests that the employee works 
under an arrangement which entitles the Government to his time and service. Likewise, 
the provision giving heads of Department discretion as to the time when the leave of 
absence shall be allowed presupposes that the arrangement or contract between the 
Government and the employee gives the Government control over the question when the 
employee shall work; and only a continuous time contract accords with that supposition." 
75 This is so in the absence of a controlling statutory provision as leave of absence 
is not a legally enforceable right. 19 Dec. C.T. 661 (1913). 
76 Butler v. United States, 101 Ct. CI. 641 at 644 (1944); 7 Comp. Gen. 83 (1927), 
and the authorities there cited. 
77 Ibid. The reason for this is that "to authorize payment of salary for accrued 
unused leave of absence subsequent to the separation of the officers from the service 
would be equivalent to increasing the salary rate for the three offices in excess of that 
specifically authorized by statute, which, of course, was not intended and is not author-
ized." 7 Comp. Gen. 83 at 85 (1927). 
78 Field v. Giegenack, (D.C. Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 945; Butler v. United States, 101 
Ct. CI. 641 (1944); 12 Comp. Gen. 301 (1932). 
79 Harrison v. United States, 26 Ct. CI. 259 at 269 (1891). 
so Butler v. United States, 101 Ct. CI. 641 at 644 (1944). 
81 (D.C. Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 945. 
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days to fifteen- days was held not to be in violation of the consti-
tutional provision prohibiting the taking of private property for 
public use without compensation, even so far as it affected leave 
then accrued. Associate Justice Hitz considered82 that, as the 
office itself was not a contractual or property right but a revocable 
privilege, leave of absence could be no more. As we have seen, 
no pensioner has a vested legal right to his pension which is a 
bounty of the government which Congress may give, withhold, 
reduce or recall at its discretion, and Associate Justice Hitz argued 
that a leave of absence with pay bears more analogy to a pension 
than to a wage. He then said: "Under these statutes, leave of 
absence tentatively accrues to a beneficiary by virtue of his service, 
yet is not earned in the sense that his wage is earned, which be-
comes absolutely due and inevitably payable upon his performance 
of his work. But the leave must be specially sought, granted, 
and used, under certain conditions and within certain times, 
determined within the statutory maximum and regulations, by 
the public printer, with due regard to the needs of the service 
and justice to the individual."83 
Then, in Butlerv. United States,84 the Court of Claims affirmed 
the view that Congress may take away from a government employee 
the leave formerly granted him, which had accrued at the time 
of his discharge. The court considered that an employee has no 
vested right to his position and may be discharged at any time 
at the will of the sovereign, whether he is working at the time or is 
on leave,85 from which it inferred that an employee has no vested 
right to the leave to which he was entitled under the law in force 
at the time of his discharge. 
This view of the legal position leaves much to be desired, both 
from a theoretical and from a practical standpoint. In the first 
place, and contrary to what was assumed in both the Field and 
Butler cases, it does not necessarily follow from the fact that neither 
82 Id. at 946-947. 
83 Id. at 947. 
84101 Ct. CI. 641 (1944). This decision goes much further than that in Field v. 
Giegenack. In the latter case the statutory provision clearly left the amount of leave 
granted and the time when it might be taken by the employee to the discretion of the 
Public Printer, whereas in Butler's case the statute purported to grant leave without 
attaching any strings to the grant. In view of this, Field v. Giegenack is not an author-
ity against the view suggested herein that leave with pay when properly made part of 
the compensation of the employee (as where an unconditional "right" is given to the 
employee) should be treated as a vested right, and it may reasonably be argued that the 
lone contrary authority, Butler v. United States, was incorrectly decided on this point. 
85 Citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21 (1926). 
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an office nor an employment is a contract that none of the inci-
dents thereof may be contractual. It is quite possible to have a 
relationship dependent basically upon the public law, i.e., a status 
relationship, where some of the incidents are regulated by contract. 
The marriage relationship is a good example of this. It is necessary 
to distinguish between the nature of a relationship and the nature 
of the incidents of that relationship, and, even where a relation-
ship is a creation of the public law, certain of its incidents may 
be regulated by contract. Indeed, it is probably not going too 
far to say that in a given status relationship all those incidents 
which are not in fact regulated by the public law (those regulated 
by the public law may be termed status incidents) are subject to 
the will of the parties and may be regulated by their agreement. 
In the second place, it is suggested that a leave of absence with 
pay, and this applies particularly to annual leave, bears more 
analogy to a wage than it does to a pension, and that the supposi-
tion of Associate Justice Hitz that leave of absence accrues only 
tentatively is artificial and illogical. It is clear that no one would 
think of reading an act fixing the salaries of employees to mean 
that one who ceases to be an employee, by resignation or discharge, 
disables himself from drawing pay earned while he was an em-
ployee, 86 and the same reasoning should apply to annual leave.87 
To put it simply, annual leave should be considered part of the 
compensation attached to an office or employment which accrues 
day by day in the same way as salary, although the enjoyment of 
it is deferred until a certain amount has accumulated and it is 
convenient for the due functioning of the department for the 
officer or employee to take it. It is not realistic to assert that the 
sole purpose of leave with pay is to provide a period of rest and 
refreshment so that the employee may return and better serve 
the government after his leave. Judge Madden, dissenting in 
Butler's case, pointed out: "But to make this better service the 
quid pro quo £or the employer's agreement to give leave with pay, 
so that the employee would not be really entitled to the pay for 
his leave period until he had returned and given the employer 
the benefit of his re-created energy for a sufficient period, would · 
86 Per Madden, J., dissenting in Butler's case, 101 Ct. CI. 641 at 648 (1944). 
87 If this is not a valid argument, it is possible that the established practice of 
fixing the date of separation of an employee far enough ahead to permit him to take 
the leave to which he is "entitled" before he is dropped from the pay roll is not author• 
ized by law. Admittedly, however, the employee is not entitled to have this done as 
of right (see the references in note 78 supra). 
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be a difficult bargain to spell out in a labor agreement or a statute 
and, so far as I know, it has never been read into such an 
arrangement by implication."88 
However, notwithstanding the theoretical and practical desir-
ability of this approach, the legal position is clear89 and, no matter 
how the statute purporting to grant the leave is worded,90 the 
government acting through Congress may reduce, withhold or 
deny completely an officer's or employee's "rights" to leave with 
or without pay.91 
E. Promotion 
One of the distinctive features of government employment is 
the provision made in the regulations and rules governing the 
conditions of service for promotions in rank and increases in 
salary. Opportunities for advancement and pay schedules based 
on years of service and grade of position are important factors to 
be considered by any-person seeking a career in the government 
service, and it is worthwhile to consider briefly the two aspects of 
this matter-the power of promotion and the right to promotion. 
The powers to promote and to reduce have generally been 
considered not so much as incidents of the power of appointment 
as species of that power.92 This is illustrated by the long-estab-
lished practice of submitting nominations for promotion in the 
armed forces ( officers being appointed by the President by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate) to the Senate for con-
firmation and of thereafter issuing a commission for the higher 
office. Now, appointment of officers is an executive function,93 
88101 Ct. CI. 641 at 648 (1944). 
89 But see note 84 supra. 
90 E.g., in Butler's case the relevant statute provided, " ... all civilian officers and 
employees of the United States ... shall be entitled to twenty-six days' annual leave 
with pay each calendar year, exclusive of Sundays and holidays .... " [49 Stat. L. 1161 
(1936)]. The only condition apparently attached to the grant was that the leave "shall 
be granted at such time as the heads of the various departments and independent 
establishments may prescribe." 
91 Of course, so long as a statute unconditionally granting an employee leave is in 
force, the employee has a right to the leave provided that he complies with the condi-
tions imposed by statute, and he may enforce the right. Barringer v. United States, 
188 U.S. 577, 23 S.Ct. 405 (1903), and the cases there cited. However, this is not because 
he has a property right to the leave but because the Executive cannot avoid the peremp-
tory obligation to grant the leave imposed on it by Congress. 
92 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 355 at 356 (1896). 
93 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21 (1926); Humphrey's Executor 
(Rathbun) v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 55 S.Ct. 869 (1935). 
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yet the courts have in at least two cases94 issued a mandamus com-
pelling a government official to promote a government servant 
to a grade to which he was entitled to progress automatically under 
statute. Again, in an opinion of the attorney general it is said: 
"Now appointment in the Army as in any other depart-
ment of the Government is an executive, not legislative, act. 
. . . Congress may point out the general class of individuals 
from which an appointment must be made, if made at all, but 
it cannot control the President's discretion to the extent of 
compelling him to commission a designated individual. . . . 
It follows, therefore, that, while promotion is a "right" in-
hering in the officer next in the line of promotion and practi-
cally almost certain to vest in him, it is yet inchoate in its na-
ture and its legal vesting is subject to the fundamental 
condition of an appointment by the President. . . ."95 
But, whatever this may mean, it does not answer our prob-
lem, and it seems to the writer that it is incorrect to treat pro-
motion as always being a species of appointment. From the point 
of view of our analysis there are two types of promotion: (I) where 
a government servant is appointed to a new office or employment 
as is the case in army promotions which are confirmed by the 
Senate, and (2) where a government servant, while still in effect 
holding the same position, is advanced in grade or pay. In the 
latter case there is not an appointment in the constitutional sense 
and, therefore, Congress under its power to prescribe conditions 
of employment may provide for automatic promotions. But, where 
the promotion amounts to a new appointment, Congress cannot 
usurp the executive power. 
It is difficult to speak of a government servant having the 
right to promotion.96 But, just as we saw in the cases where an 
employee sues his superior administrative officer for accrued pen-
sion or leave as provided for in a particular statute regarding that 
branch of the government service, so an employee may enforce 
as against his superior officer a statutory right to promotion of 
94 Macfarland v. Russell, 31 App. D.C. 321 (1908); Farley v. Welch, (D.C. Cir. 1937) 
92 F. (2d) 533. 
95 29 Op. Atty. Gen. 254 at 256-257 (1911). 
96 No matter what the statute says, the right of an individual to an office does not 
vest even in a limited sense of the word, until the appointment has been made by the 
proper authority. An attorney general said in an early opinion with respect to a pro-
motion in the army [13 Op. Atty. Gen. 13 at 14 (1869)]: "But these laws and regula-
tions .•. do not confer any right to the vacant place. This he can acquire only by virtue 
of a new commission." And see 30 Op. Atty. Gen. 10 (1913). 
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the second type referred to above.97 .In such q1ses the government 
servant is asserting a right given to him by express legislation and 
not a contractual and property right and, consequently, he has 
no remedy if his "right" to the promotion is varied or· annulled 
by statute. 
F. Resignation 
There is still some doubt as to the right of an officer or em-
ployee of the United States to resign from the government service. 
In a recent decision the comptroller general said: "The general 
rule in the United States is that a public officer has the right to 
resign. That right may be absolute, i.e., he may resign at his 
mere will or pleasure without any regard to the will or convenience 
of the appointing power, or his right to resign may be limited, 
i.e., may become effective only with the consent of the appointing 
power."98 
Notwithstanding certain dicta holding to the contrary, it is 
submitted that the decision in United States v. Wright.,99 decided 
back in 1839, is still an accurate interpretation of the law. In that 
case Circuit Justice McLean said: "There can be no doubt that. 
a civil officer has a right to resign his office at pleasure and it is 
not in the power of the executive to compel him to remain in 
office. It is only necessary that the resignation should be received, 
to take effect, and this does not depend upon the acceptance or 
rejection of the resignation by the· president."100 This principle 
was followed in the only other decision of the courts involving 
the resignation of a federal official that I have found,101 but in other 
decisions102 of the courts it has been trenchantly criticized. The 
view of these other cases is that, in order to be effective, a resigna-
tion must be accepted by the appointing power, and reliance is 
placed upon the common law rule that resignation of a public 
officer is not complete until the proper authority accepts it, or 
does something tantamount thereto such as to appoint a successor. 
Then, there is the assumption in a recent decision of the comp-
97 On this view the decisions referred to in note 94 supra are undoubtedly correct. 
98 25 Comp. Gen. 241 at 243 (1945). 
99 (C.C. Ohio 1839) 28 Fed. Cas. 792, No. 16,775. 
100 Id. at 793. 
101 Barbour v. United States, 17 Ct. Cl. 149 (1881). See this case, too, for an excellent 
analysis as to what constitutes a resignation. 
102Edwards v. United States, 103 U.S. 471 (1880), and the cases there cited. See 
also 19 A.L.R. 39 (1922). 
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troller general103 that this rule may apply to employees of the 
United States, even though the only possible justification for the 
principle lies in the historical origins of an office. Furthermore, 
none of the English cases relied on in the leading American de-
cision of Edwards v. United States1°4 related to officers of the 
central government and, indeed, in that decision the Court refers 
only to a person "elected to a municipal office" in England.105 
It is suggested then that all civil officers and employees of the 
United States have a right to resign which is not contingent upon 
acceptance by the appointing power.106 But it is settled law that, 
as in the United Kingdom,107 members of the armed forces have 
a limited right to resign, in that their resignation does not become 
effective unless and until it is accepted by the proper authority.108 
Conclusions 
It is hardly necessary to repeat that all offices must be created 
by law and appointment thereto made in one of the constitu-
tionally authorized modes. Nor is it necessary to consider in 
detail the numerous authorities holding that offices are neither 
property nor contractual rights but are public trusts or privileges 
revocable at the will of the sovereign power. Initially, the courts 
assumed that, although there were contracts between officers and 
governments, they did not give rise to the type of obligations pro-
tected by the Constitution from impairment by state govern-
ments.100 But, the courts soon began to consider the issue more 
from the point of view of public policy,110 and now the theory 
that offices and employments are neither property nor contractual 
rights is based on two equally valid propositions: (1) neither 
103 20 Comp. Gen. 321 (1940). 
104 103 U.S. 471 (1880). 
105 Id. at 473. 
100 This view is supported by an obiter dictum of Moss, J., in Brown v. United 
States, 67 Ct. CI. 172 at 176 (1929): "The employee may likewise resign at any time, 
although appointed for a definite term, without the consent of the Government, and 
without incurring any liability to the Government, by so doing." 
101 Hearson v. Churchill and others, [1892] 2 Q.B. 144; Parker v. Clive, 4 Burr. 
2419, 98 Eng. Rep. 267 (1769). 
10s Mimmack v. United States, 97 U.S. 426 (1878); 22 Op. Atty. Gen. 237 (1898); 
18 Comp. Gen. 528 (1938). 
109 An indication of this approach is seen as recently as 1950 in Bailey v. Richard-
son, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46, where it was said, at 57, that (with reference to 
the applicability of the Fifth Amendment), "It has been held repeatedly and consistently 
that Government employ •.• in this particular .•. is not a contract." 
:110 There are indications of this approach in Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. (51 
U.S.) 402 at 417 (1850), and it dominates the later cases. 
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Congress nor the Executive should fetter in any way its freedom 
by entering into obligations to be performed at a future time,111 
and (2) the Executive cannot in the absence of statutory authority 
impose any pecuniary liability on Congress or the United States.112 
Employments in the federal service must be established by 
law,113 but it is possible for the government, under statutory 
authority, to contract away some of its freedom of action. Back 
in 1880 the Supreme Court held114 that a contract between a state 
and the plaintiff, made pm:suant to a state statute whereby the 
plaintiff was to perform certain duties for a specified period at a 
stipulated compensation, was within the protection of the constitu-
tional provision prohibiting the impairment of the obligations of 
contracts, and, on his executing it, he was entitled to that compen-
sation although, before the expiration of the period during which 
the services were rendered, the state repealed the statute. Nearly 
sixty years later the Court applied the same principle in holding 
that state governments may by contract surrender their power to 
regulate the tenure of public school teachers.115 
These cases related to state offices, and the constitutional pro-
vision prohibiting the impairment of the obligations of contracts 
applies to states and not to the federal government. However, it 
is clear that valid contracts are property within the protection 
111 E.g., Butler v. Pennsylvania, id. at 417: "They are functions appropriate to 
that class of powers and obligations by which governments are enabled, and are called 
upon, to foster and promote the general good; functions, therefore, which governments 
cannot be presumed to have surrendered, if indeed they can under any circumstances 
be justified in surrendering them.'' 
112 E.g., Jordan v. United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 577 at 591: "Congress is the only body 
under our Constitution with the authority to consent to the assumption of liability by 
the United States or authorize others to do so.'' 
113 See note 38 supra. 
114 Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U.S. 5 (1880). At pp. 10-11 the Court quoted from the 
opinion of Story, J., in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (21 U.S.) 
518 at •694 (1819): "It is admitted that the state legislatures have power to enlarge, 
repeal and limit the authorities of public officers, in their official capacities, in all cases, 
where the constitutions of the States respectively do not prohibit them; and this, among 
others, for the very reason, that there is no express or implied contract, that they shall 
always, during their continuance in office, exercise such authorities. . • • But when the 
legislature makes a contract with a public officer, as in the case of a stipulated salary 
for his services, during a limited period, this, during the limited period, is just as much 
a contract, within the purview of the constitutional prohibition, as a like contract would 
be between two private citizens.'' 
115 Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 58 S.Ct. 443 (1938); Dodge v. 
Board of Education, 302 U.S. 74, 58 S.Ct. 98 (1937); Phelps v. Board of Education, 300 
U.S. 319, 57 S.Ct. 483 (1937). And see Brown v. United States, 39 Ct. Cl. 255 (1904), 
where the Court apparently considered that, in certain circumstances, the government 
might bind itself to employ a person for a definite period. 
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of the Fifth Amendment,11 6 and in view of this a strong argument 
may be made for the application of the cases involving state offices 
to federal employment. Indeed, in the 1880 case the Supreme 
Court said: "The same reasoning is applicable to the countless 
employees in the same way, under the national govemment.''117 
But, it is not every acceptance of employment which creates 
a contract protected by the Constitution. Justice Roberts, who 
wrote the opinions in all three cases on this issue decided by the 
Court in 1937 and 1938, said in Dodge v. Board of Education:118 
"In determining whether a law tenders a contract to a 
citizen it is of first importance to examine the language of the 
statute. If it provides for the execution of a written contract 
on behalf of the state the case for an obligation binding upon 
the state is clear.119 ••• On the other hand, an act merely fix-
ing salaries of public officers creates no contract in their favor, 
and the compensation . . . may be altered at the will of the 
legislature. This is true also of an act fixing the term or tenure 
of a public officer or an employee of a state agency. The pre-
sumption is that such a law is not intended to create private 
contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be 
pursued until the legislature shall ordain otherwise. He who 
asserts the creation of a contract with the state in such a case 
has the burden of overcoming the presumption. .If, upon a 
construction of the statute, it is found that the payments are 
gratuities, involving no agreement of the parties, the grant 
of them creates no vested right." 
Justice Black, who dissented in Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. 
Brand,12° seemed to think that, as the rights claimed were created 
by the public law through the medium of the statute authorizing 
the contract, those rights could not be considered contractual. 
But, as the majority opinion in the same case pointed out, "The 
source of authority for the so-called permanent teacher's contract 
is the statute. The legislature need not have provided for such con-
tracts, but, since it did so provide, the entire statute, with all of its 
provisions, must be read into and considered as a part of the con-
tract."121 
116 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 at 579, 54 S.Ct. 840 (1934), and the cases 
there cited. 
117 Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U.S. 5 at IO (1880). 
118 302 U.S. 74 at 78-79, 58 S.Ct. 98 (1937). 
119 This was the case in Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U.S. 5 (1880). 
120 303 U.S. 95 at 109 ff. 
121 Id. at 107, quoting from Arbum v. Hunt, 207 Ind. 61 at 64, 191 N.E. 148 (19M). 
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In the United States the public law dominates and controls 
practically all the incidents of the government-servant relationship 
so that, in the usual case, the only contractual incident is the right 
to compensation for past services. It would seem then that with 
the authority of the public law, the federal government and its 
officer or employee, as the case may be, may annex contractual inci-
dents to their legal relationship, which, create constitutionally pro-
tected rights. Whether or not there is a limit to the rights which 
may be so created is a difficult question and admits of no certain 
answer. The decided cases have thus far related only to pensions 
and compensation where the term of the employment was cut 
short by a statute repealing the act under which the contract with 
the government had been made. 
In special cases, then, where there is a"statute specifically provid-
ing for the creation of contractual rights against the government, 
the government servant will have rights which are enforceable 
against the government. But in the typical employment relation-
ship, the government servant has no rights in respect to the enforce-
ment against the United States of the terms of employment, except 
as to compensation. This is because almost all elements of the typi-
cal government-servant relationship are status incidents which do 
not give rise to vested rights in the government servant. But, the 
right to past compensation is in all cases a contractual incident of 
that relationship. Consequently, the government servant has a 
vested right to compensation for past services of which he cannot 
be deprived by statute and thus he can recover arrears of salary 
from the government. 
